



COP29

Baku
Azerbaijan

African Civil Society Position for UNFCCC-COP29:

Towards Securing Ambitious
Needs Based New Collective
Quantified Goal (NCQG) on
Climate Finance



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Preamble

Securing an ambitious needs based New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance in Azerbaijan has been a primary expectation from diverse stakeholders from Africa. This aspiration has been shaped by the the struggles of people at the frontline of climate crisis and PACJA's experience at previous COPs, a majority that have closed without any substantive decision on matters climate finance. Baku, seems cut out to deliver on the climate promise - the much deserved climate finance for advancing the imperatives for just climate action through adaptation, just transition and mitigation ensuring women, youth, indigenous peoples, smallholder farmers, pastoralists, fisher folk, Workers, Trade Unions have the means to implement climate action

This statement consolidates the views, reflections, and communiqués of over 3,000 representatives from diverse backgrounds who participated in various convenings hosted by PACJA and its sectoral-thematic partners, in collaboration with other pan-African institutions throughout the year. Notably, it includes insights from:

- ▶ Multi-Stakeholder Consultations on Outcome of COP28 & Strategy for COP29: Marshaling Africa's efforts and direction in climate action through multistakeholder processes
- ▶ Regional dialogue on loss and damage - access modalities and the Santiago Network on loss and damage
- ▶ Africa Climate Talks in collaboration with AUC and UNECA with a focus on securing ambitious NDCs (NDC V.3.0), May 2024
- ▶ Launch of the Six30 campaign amplifying the urgent need for energy access in the continent and the need for supportive financing and policy plans
- ▶ Placing health into mainstream of climate change discourse (Malawi, Ministerial convenings on the sidelines of ACS, COP28 & ARFSD convening
- ▶ Technical Working Preparatory meeting for Carbon markets conference in Lusaka, Zambia, June 2024
- ▶ UN CSO Conference on the Summit of the future, held in Nairobi
- ▶ Informal Africa -Europe climate convening on the sidelines of SB60 in Bonn, asserting the need to forge new forms of solidarity in advancing collective interests of Europe and Africa continents and the need for Europe to support measures that leaffrog adaptationonn in Africa
- ▶ Africa Carbon Markets Conference, Addis Ababa, August, 2024
- ▶ African Regional Consultative Dialogue on critical minerals and just transition, Johannesburg, August 2024
- ▶ Political mobilization for action through Multiple Parliamentary convenings in EALA, (Arusha) PAP (Midrand) and Abidjan on the Sidelines of CCDA XXI
- ▶ Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA XII) with a sharp focus on Adaptation finance in Abidjan, August 27 - September 03, 2024
- ▶ Global Peoples Assembly and the summit of the Future
- ▶ Africa Ministerial Conference on the Environment, Tenth Special Session, Abidjan, 3-6 September 2024
- ▶ Extensive country level consultations involving civil societies, non state actors and their Pre-COP29 engagements with state entities.

OVERARCHING MESSAGES

Inspired by Keep Your Promise Campaign and its clarion call for holding leadership from the global north to account, this statement is signposted by 6 overarching messages :

1. Amplifies the Paris Agreement Principles, particularly on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities based on Respective Capabilities, placing developed countries parties at the centre of leadership of transformative climate action
2. Our bold and sustained call for transparency, accountability and bold anti-corruption measures to ensure good governance of climate action and climate finance flows to communities at the frontline of climate crisis
3. Our unrelenting demand that developed countries fulfil their historical responsibility and provide adequate and predictable finance, technology transfer, and capacity building to support adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage in Africa is guaranteed.
4. Call for the adoption of an ambitious and need-based New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG) at COP29 that supports developing countries' transitions to low carbon and climate resilient development through implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).
5. The focus of just transition must be sufficiently comprehensive to include:- just and equitable mitigation, just adaptation and resilience, financing for the Just transitions, just trade including increasing access to finance and technology.
6. Amplify the seven voluntary Guiding Principles of the United Nations Secretary General's Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals to secure rights, integrity of planet, justice in tapping on critical minerals value chains for transition, good governance economic diversification and international cooperation to promote peace & security

STATE OF PLAY ON VARIOUS TRACKS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND KEY DEMANDS

A. ADAPTATION

A.1. State of play on Adaptation

- ▶ The climate crisis is increasingly alarming, with 2024 likely to be one of the hottest years on record with Greenhouse gas concentrations have surpassed 420 ppm of CO₂, driving global warming towards a dangerous 2.7°C increase by century's end.
- ▶ The first Global Stocktake reaffirms the inadequacies of both climate actions and support and echoes the IPCC AR6 report that asserts Africa will be impacted by climate change under all mitigation scenarios, setting basis for agitation for concrete and accelerated adaptation actions to enable communities at the frontline of the crisis to cope with impacts of climate change
- ▶ The acknowledgement that there is scientifically backed correlation between the amount of carbon emissions and the level of adaptation needed to address climate change. Noting that the higher levels of carbon emissions are associated with greater global warming, which in turn increases the severity and frequency of climate-related impacts, which necessitate more extensive and robust adaptation measures to protect communities and environments.
- ▶ There is growing mutual understanding on the need to scale up adaptation action and support to ensure an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal. The Global Goal

on Adaptation (GGA) and its framework needs to be further operationalized, and in particular the adequacy of adaptation action and support in relation to adaptation needs in a broader sense and more specific to sectors such as agriculture, water, health, biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements.

- ▶ According to the 2023 Adaptation Gap Report, the finance needed to implement domestic adaptation plans in developing countries is estimated at US\$387 billion per year until 2030, most of which will require international support to deliver. Rationalized with the 15 percent decline in adaptation finance flows to developing countries in 2021 to around US\$21 billion, it is apparently clearly that neither the goal of doubling 2019 international finance flows to developing countries by 2025 nor a possible new collective quantified goal for 2030 will significantly close the finance gap on their own.

A.2.: Key demands and asks on Adaptation

1. Underscore the importance of advancing work at COP 29 towards fully operationalizing the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) including through UAE-Belem work programme on indicators; particularly in respect of adaptation dimensions - impacts, planning, implementation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) - noting the importance of means of implementation (finance, capacity building and technology transfer) as a cross-cutting issue in each of the dimensions and themes
2. The funding for adaptation should be scaled up to meet the needs and objectives of the GGA - NCQG must respond to the funding needs of the thematic and dimensional targets agreed under the UAE Framework for Global Resilience
3. Call for a greater recognition on the direct causative relationship between carbon emissions and the need for adaptation in the determination of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), including correlating and integrating level of carbon emissions to the level of mitigation actions required and adaptation support obligations through adaptation finance.
4. Urge African countries to develop adaptation centric Nationally Determined Contributions to ensure adaptation finance and all support mechanisms are significantly scaled up to support development and implementations of NAPs and other adaptation strategies.
5. The NCQG and GGA linkages must be developed to embed the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) in the NCQG decision. We therefore call for establishment of an ambitious sub-goal for adaptation finance that is focused on the provision of public, grant-based finance, is responsive to the needs of developing countries, as expressed in countries' NDCs, NAPs and other national plans and responds to actual needs based on circumstances of nations and communities based on participatory assessments.
6. Call for increased climate finance for needs based adaptation for Africa to seize opportunities for job creation, green growth in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. In this regard key sectors such as health, agriculture, water and other livelihood sub-sectors should receive huge allocation of funding under the sub-goal on GGA under the NCQG
7. Assert that adaptation finance should flow largely through mechanisms and channels that are open and accessible to all developing countries and able to provide finance directly to them, and where these countries are equitably represented in decision-making bodies and able to set the agenda and direction of the institutions. This means privileging bodies under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, particularly the Adaptation Fund.
8. Commit to ensuring that adaptation finance is gender responsive and that climate finance channels take into account human rights, rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, refugees, workers, youth, children, persons with disabilities, and people in vulnerable situations, as well as the right to development and intergenerational equity.

9. Emphasize agriculture, food security, water and health are key priorities of Africa, and call for ambitious targets in the NDCs and provision of explicit quantum of financial resources within the NCQG and other means of implementation (technology development and transfer, and capacity-building) for the implementation of adaptation measures. In this regard, Africa must build an understanding of the nexus that exists among the various sectors.
10. Call for integration of human mobility into Global Goal on Adaptation, national climate adaptation plans, enhancing cross-border cooperation, and ensuring the rights and dignity of all displaced person by implementing policies that protect and empower those affected by climate-induced displacement as a result of losses and damages associated with climate change.
11. At COP29, developed countries must agree to provide the required Means of Implementation to support the formulation and implementation of NAPs

B. CLIMATE FINANCE

B.1: State at Play on Climate Finance

- ▶ COP 29 referred to as the “Finance COP” should deliver on NCQG that is based on achieving the goals agreed to in Glasgow, Sharm and Dubai, as well as evolving needs as reflected in countries’ NDCs, NAPs, and other national climate planning and programming instruments, and should reflect the GST outcome.
- ▶ However, Africa is disadvantaged in accessing and attracting international climate finance and global trade resulting in African countries spending 5% -15% of their GDP to respond to climate impacts. This contributes to most African countries facing unsustainable debt situation which is worsened by the general global rise in lending interest rates and exchange rate shifts after the Covid 19 and the war in Ukraine.
- ▶ The Needs Determination Report, produced by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) clearly states the magnitude of the current needs that the NCQG should respond to, placing the scales of financial support needed for current NDCs at the scale of USD 5.8 trillion by 2030. As such developed countries must provide leadership to provide the scale of climate finance required as trillions of dollars are needed annually to tackle the climate crisis and restore trust in the multilateral system.
- ▶ But developed countries must be alive to the quality of climate finance as unsustainable debt burden, high cost of capital and increasing use of non-concessional finance instruments continue to hinder the ability of African countries to achieve their climate and development goals. The current financial instruments provided to developing countries are increasing debt stress, and the share of loans to Africa in total ODA in 2022 increased by 29%. The NCQG framework should therefore address the types of finance instruments and their relative contribution to the quantum, with a clear share for public grant finance.
- ▶ African countries find themselves facing fiscal constraints and increasing debt burdens, at a time when adaptation action is becoming more urgent, and development needs are still very large, restricting their ability to invest in their own adaptation. In Africa, debt is not only growing faster than GDP, but the increasing pressure of interest payments is substantial, with many countries allocating 10% or more of government revenues to interest payments, which constrains spending in other priorities, including adaptation to climate change.
- ▶ The climate finance landscape is plagued by misinformation and miscounting. Developed countries frequently engage in double-counting to show they have met their financial obligations. In some cases, projects unrelated to climate action are counted as climate finance. This lack of transparency distorts the true scale of available resources for adaptation efforts, especially in Africa.

- ▶ Making financial flows consistent with Paris Agreement goals (Article 2.1C of the Paris agreement) should be in the context of supporting sustainable development and poverty eradication as per Article 2 of the Paris Agreement and in line with the agreed principles in Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement. We stress that such an approach should reflect just transitions considering fully the social and economic dimensions of the transitions, while avoiding creating conditionalities on access to finance or flows of investments to African countries.
- ▶ We note bold attempts to depart from the principles of the Paris Agreement and particularly, the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities with developed countries parties pushing for expanding the contributor base to include private sector entities and minimalistic approaches that propose US.100 billion as the baseline for the NCQG. Equally, there are simmering attempts to procrastinate and postpone the securing of the NCQG on climate finance to Belem in Brazil (COP30)

B.2: Key demands and asks - Climate Finance

1. Call for the adoption of an ambitious and need-based New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG) at COP29 that supports developing countries' transitions to low carbon and climate resilient development through implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).
2. Further call for an NCQG that responds to the global economic challenges, high capital costs, and debt sustainability issues faced by developing countries and emphasize the commitment of developed countries to their obligations on provision of finance in accordance with the UN Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Agreement;
3. Call for an NCQG with a quantum of not less than USD 1.3 trillion annually, as a mobilization and provision of climate finance goal to be regularly reviewed to reflect the evolving needs of developing countries, delivered mainly through grants, in particular for adaptation and loss and damage, with enhanced access and transparency for such resources;
4. For purpose of clarity, we assert that the USD.100 billion cannot be a baseline for the NCQG, and call for significantly higher commitment, reflecting African countries' actual needs to address climate change.
5. We emphasize the importance of advancing discussions on the reform of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and a new financing architecture that is responsive to Africa's and other developing countries' needs including debt restructuring and relief, governance issues, finance terms and instruments to enhance quantum of finance that is consistent with the objectives of the Paris Agreement;
6. The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance must provide for sufficient resources to implement adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage and just transitions interventions
7. While vesting the responsibility of providing and mobilising climate finance to developed countries, the goal should be ambitious to reflect the true scale and urgency of addressing the climate crisis, and prioritize use financial instruments that enhance the availability, responsiveness, and effectiveness of climate finance without placing additional economic or financial burdens on developing countries
8. The finance should be grant-based, predictable, reliable and time-bound, considering the historical responsibilities of developed countries for emissions, and must be designed to avoid maladaptation and climate debt burden.
9. The NCQG must commit to more and simpler disbursement processes and lower transaction costs, while promoting a simplified direct access particularly for communities at the frontline of climate crisis and their agencies for impactful climate action

10. Climate finance, to be secured under the NCQG should contribute to Climate Justice NOT Growing Debt portfolio for Africa. As such the quantum of grant-based finance and for supporting adaptation within the NCQG must be certain in decision to be made in Baku. For Clarity PACJA asserts that loans by developed countries parties to African countries do not constitute climate finance contribution by developed countries, but by African countries
11. The NCQG must guarantee and be delivered in accordance with the principle of additionality, by providing new climate finance that is over and above the Official Development Assistance (ODA).
12. The NCQG must have a concrete, yearly targets over a 5-year duration, aligned to the thematic subgoals for mitigation, adaptation, and loss & damage, in line with the NDC cycle, complemented with mechanisms of tracing progress through structured mini-stock-takes
13. The NCQG should be periodically revised and updated to respond to the evolving needs of developing countries.
14. Establish a common definition of climate finance within the NCQG and transparency arrangements to facilitate accurate accounting, reporting and oversight.

C. LOSS AND DAMAGE

C.1: State at Play Loss and damage

- ▶ The devastating impacts of climate change are increasing in frequency and severity, creating irreversible loss and damage. Across Africa are disproportionately impacted by climate change-induced severe weather, despite their negligible contributions to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2022, floods, drought and heat waves affected over 110 million people across the continent and resulted in economic damages exceeding US\$ 8.5 billion and the frequency and intensity of these impacts will continue to increase
- ▶ According to the IPCC, Africa has suffered annual losses of \$7 billion due to climate change between 2010 and 2019, and under high-emissions scenarios, this figure could rise to \$50 billion by 2040, causing a 2-4% reduction in Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth per year by 2040 and a 10-25% reduction by 2100.
- ▶ Even with the paltry USD.700 million committed to the fund, the Loss and Damage is yet to release funding to countries most impacted by climate change and together with the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage, both are yet to contribute to capacity and financial support anticipated for effective response to climate triggered disasters
- ▶ There are gaps in coordination, collaboration and coherence in the implementation of the respective mandates and functions of the different bodies dealing with loss and damage including the Fund, Santiago Network, and Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) in supporting vulnerable people and nations
- ▶ There is no single no global climate institution dealing with climate change that is hosted in the continent, and Africa, a continent that has special needs and circumstances seems to have been short charged in its pursuit to host the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage
- ▶ September 2023 timeline for the first grant to flow from the loss and damage fund has not been met, a clear indication of sloppy prioritization as global funding for the humanitarian sector further shrinks, leaving communities more exposed.

C.2: Key demands and asks on Loss and Damage

1. We reiterate our rejection of the proposal for voluntary contribution to the Loss and Damage fund as advanced by developed countries. Raising vital new and additional finance in the form of grants, not loans, to pay to address loss and damage, and strengthening legislation to embed the polluter pays principle into law whilst also propelling emission cuts;
2. Call for the full operationalization of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage with sufficient resources, beyond the USD.700million, to respond to the needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effect of climate change in responding to loss and damage, including a focus on addressing loss and damage, and for the operationalization of the Santiago Network for Loss and damage (SNLD) including provision of adequate support for technical assistance;
3. Pursue access modalities for the loss and damage to ensure the procedure of allocation is clear/ enabling direct access; and in form of grants
4. Loss and Damage finance must be included in the NCQG with a dedicated sub-goal to secure new, additional, predictable, and adequate resources to address its specific challenges while guarding against diluting the adaptation sub-goal
5. Call for the reversal of recent decision to host the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage in Geneva rather than Nairobi by the Advisory Board during its inaugural meeting, that disregards a UN recommendation that identified Nairobi as a more cost-effective and strategically beneficial location for technical assistance for the implementation of relevant approaches for addressing L&D at the local, national and regional level in developing countries.
6. Parties should include L&D in their next round of NDCs, including details about cost estimates to drive predictable and adequate finance.
7. The Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss & Damage (WIM) review must be comprehensive, including a review of the fulfillment of its third function on enhancing action and support for loss and damage. The WIM must continue to report to both the COP and CMA.

D. JUST TRANSITION

D.1: State at Play just transition

- ▶ The objective of the Just transition work programme is to shape pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of Article 2, paragraph 2, with view to adopting decisions to support implementation of just transitions and efforts to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication more effectively
- ▶ GST outcomes underscored the importance of addressing the sustainable development challenges in African countries in a just, orderly and equitable manner with the importance of enhanced international cooperation and the international enabling environment being emphasized. There was an explicit call on the Roadmap to Mission 1.5 and the TROIKA to provide clear guidance of UNFCCC engagement of the international cooperation ecosystem with a view to enhancing climate action, whilst maximising sustainable development and poverty eradication.
- ▶ COP28 secured decisions relating to the energy sector and provide for provision and mobilization of the necessary means of implementation, ensuring that the continent can transition to sustainable energy systems while addressing the pressing energy access needs of its population.
- ▶ Nevertheless, Africa faces a severe energy poverty, with over 600 million people lacking access to electricity and more than 900 million people without access to clean cooking solutions, a challenge

that underscores the urgent need for substantial finance and investment in the energy sector as a top priority for the continent.

- ▶ The critical role of Africa's critical minerals resources in the just transition discourse and in advancing opportunities for developing decentralized people centred energy systems is apparent, yet Africa seems not well poised to benefit from this contribution. Projections are rife that by 2030, just four years from now, more than 90 percent of the world poor will be in Africa.
- ▶ The nexus between critical minerals and sustainable development has been well established as minerals are drivers economic growth by generating revenue for governments, decarbonizing economies, financing development projects, and improving living standards.
- ▶ Africa's critical minerals sector is highly dependent on global markets, where prices are volatile, and trade barriers can restrict access. The continent's limited bargaining power and dependency on foreign technology and expertise further undermine its ability to negotiate favourable terms in the global supply chain. In nearly all cases, Africa's critical minerals are often exported in raw or semi-processed form, with limited local beneficiation or value addition. This deprives the continent of the economic benefits of downstream activities, such as processing, refining, and manufacturing, which are typically more lucrative.
- ▶ Its apparent that quick shift to value addition of critical minerals in the continent may not be feasible in the short run due to secured concession for supply of these critical minerals in mid-range periods and policy and legal constraints from our trading partners
- ▶ As such truthful relations between the two blocks will be premised in supporting Africa's efforts to adding value to these minerals locally, and becoming a competitive hub for green industrialization including processing minerals into batteries and other components for renewable energy technologies, which can create jobs and stimulate economic activity.
- ▶ The evolving climate and environment based unilateral trade measures, including CBAM, and incoming UK and US carbon boarder taxes among others, and stresses that the GST outcomes confirmed that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, are poised to arbitrary and unjustifiable discriminate Africa from trading with its traditional trade allies.
- ▶ The United Nations Secretary General's Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals proposes seven voluntary Guiding Principles, building on existing norms, commitments and legal obligations outlined in United Nations texts which underpin the climate justice consideration and should be mainstreamed in negotiations

D.2: Key demands and asks on just transition

1. The focus of just transition must be sufficiently comprehensive to include:- just and equitable mitigation, just adaptation and resilience, financing for the Just transitions, just trade including increasing access to finance and technology. This in the context of equity and CBDR&RC
2. COP29 must advance just transition work programme and send the right policy signals on operationalizing equity and CBDR&RC in advancing the achievement of the goals of the Paris Agreement. The Just transition work programme should reflect the priorities of Africa, in particular green industrialization, sustainable use and value addition of natural resources, addressing energy poverty and clean cooking needs, in the context of sustainable development and efforts towards poverty eradication.
3. The just transition work programme should support the implementation of countries' NDCs and promote equity and fairness in the policy space for sustainable development by developing countries, cognizant of the need for a just transition to low-carbon and climate resilient economies in line with different development needs, social, economic and environmental implications.
4. Global financing mechanisms, including climate finance must be aligned to accelerate the

transformation and the clearly envisaged benefits and must move beyond the rhetoric of exclusive investment sector for private sector to nature communities' stake in the transition

5. Africa should pursue a position, including with its trading allies such as EU and USA on specific policy frameworks, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms and carbon border taxes to ensure that this does not restrict international trade and Africa's access to market.
6. Call on developed countries parties to address policy and legal bottlenecks that impede Africa's capacity to governance and promoting people-centred approaches in investments in the transitional minerals subsector to develop national and regional value chains
7. Urge UNFCCC, within the just transition work programme, to set up a working committee to take a deep dive on how to leverage the vast critical mineral resources necessary for global transition to drive broad based and sustainable development with the principles of UN SG panel on critical minerals forming the basis
8. Call on developed countries parties to ensure global corporates involved in the exploitation of transitional minerals in Africa to stop human rights abuses and perpetuating climate insecurities in the continent
9. Just transition pathways need to consider divergent yet key intersectoral linkages (energy, transport, agriculture, waste management, health) that offer unique opportunities for ensuring and maintaining transitions of the workforces and creation of decent and green jobs, leveraging the power of youth and future generations towards securing a sustainable and equitable future for all.
10. A Just and equitable transition must encompass pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition and highlight the important role of the instruments related to social solidarity and protection in mitigating the impacts of measures taken.

E. MITIGATION

E.1: State at play on mitigation

- ▶ Scientists warn that we are staring at a time bomb that will explode if we don't decisively cut down our greenhouse gas emissions by 43% by 2030 to keep the 1.5 degrees Celsius goal alive.
- ▶ Current NDC commitments fall short of achieving emissions reduction targets, with the 2022 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report indicating that, even if all current climate pledges are successfully implemented, the planet will fall short of Paris Agreement goals and is likely to reach between 2.4 and 2.8 degrees Celsius of warming by the end of this century (IPCC 2022).
- ▶ Even if the international community were to stop emitting all greenhouse gases today, it would take decades for the climate to stabilize, and that climate disruption is here to stay for the long haul. Therefore, the call for rapid, deep, and sustained cuts in greenhouse gas emissions to limit future climate change risks to those least responsible for climate action is lauder
- ▶ The GST decision at COP 28 called for revised and ambitious NDCs and enhanced international cooperation that respond to the GST outcomes. Whereas African countries have less emissions to cut, they have submitted ambitious NDCs, but many have not been implemented due to lack of effective support. As we embark on the preparation of updated NDCs, support must be provided to African countries for the implementation of existing and new NDCs.
- ▶ Whereas in 2022, the IPCC emphasized an urgent need for greater consideration of pro-climate behavior change, estimating that comprehensive behavior changes could decrease GHG emissions by a further 40-70 percent by 2050 compared with current climate policies (IPCC 2022, 2023)

however, developed countries have been sluggish in aligning priority Practices included in NDCs with the emissions reduction potential of candidate behavior changes

- ▶ Technology development and transfer and capacity building are key to achieving NDCs and NAPs. Africa requires access to cost-effective and modern technologies in this regard. The promotion of unproven and destructive technologies, particularly solar radiation management should be avoided, and thus call for a global governance mechanism for non-use of solar radiation management
- ▶ Cities, local and regional governments play an important role in the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). To support these efforts, there is need for scaled-up and accessible climate finance that addresses the specific needs of vulnerable regions, and international financial reforms to better respond to local priorities.

E.2: Key asks on mitigation

1. Cutting down on emissions is a MUST, Not an Option, and developed countries demonstrate urgent plans for MUST PHASE OUT fossil fuels. To this end we call on developed countries to demonstrate, through the NDCs 3.0 ambitious commitments to cut on their emissions
2. Developed countries in the implementation of their mitigation policies, including the energy transition targets of the GST outcome must ensure appropriate measures to minimize intended or unintended negative impacts on the socio-economic development of developing countries and provide the appropriate support to address any challenges. We call for finalization of the five-year work program on implementation of Response Measures which will continue to guide this cooperation.
3. Call for fast tracked actions in setting targets, particularly developed countries for transitioning away from fossil fuels and for these to be reflect in their NDCs

F. CARBON MARKETS

F.1: State of play carbon markets

- ▶ After almost 20 years of carbon trading, it is clear that market-based mechanisms do not work and safeguards have not protected the indigenous people from the predatory and land grabbing practices of carbon brokers, conservation NGOs, carbon market managers, banks and states - forming what is being termed as carbon colonialism Rather, this fundamentally flawed approach incentivizes the private sector to profit from non-transparent systems.
- ▶ Whereas Africa considers carbon markets as instruments to leverage low carbon and resilient development and deliver meaningful sustainable development impacts beyond emissions reductions, there is a bold push by developed countries to centre carbon markets in the climate financing mechanisms as demonstrated by the many Africa countries are currently engaged in development of national carbon markets frameworks.
- ▶ Role confusion continue to characterise the carbon market sector - the core business of carbon markets is to scale up mitigation ambition, not raising climate finance. The notions of premising carbon credits as climate finance must be dispelled and measures initiated to reverse the narrative pushing for historical responsibility on part of parties from the global north.
- ▶ Admittable, African countries have limited information on carbon markets and are therefore engaging from point of no information. The scale of capacities needed, including for governance of the complex value chains of carbon markets may not be with the continent in immediate period.
- ▶ The carbon markets have been largely a domain of highly polluting private sector operating in developed countries, blurring the urgency for cutting on emissions and hence a false solution in climate action

F.2: Key demands on Carbon markets

1. Denounce carbon markets as green washing and false narratives as they are not solving the underlying problem of emission by developed countries parties.
2. Call for renegotiation of article 6.4 on carbon markets to better align this with the urgent call for limiting emissions in line with the Paris agreement. The core business of carbon markets in scale up mitigation ambition must be re-evaluated in light of a transparent process of assessing progress in emission reductions by the market players.
3. In the interim align our actions in the carbon markets to sectors that portend less risks on our natural resource base and advance imperatives of sustainable development. In this regard we recommend our commitment focus on technology-based carbon markets that are not a threat to sustainable land and natural resource governance and human rights of African communities.
4. We call on UNFCCC and human rights bodies of the UN to expedite investigations into numerous cases of human rights violations and land grabbing cases that are dotting Africa and largely driven by carbon investments and initiate urgent remediation measures to these violations

G. TRANSPARENCY

G.1: State at Play Transparency

- ▶ There are well noted gaps in reporting both on mitigation outcomes (fossil fuels phase out) and in delivery on climate finance commitments with double counting of ODA as climate finance
- ▶ In many instances information related to climate change including related to NDCs and NAPs remains unclear and least understood by general public impairing broad based pursuit for accountability
- ▶ Whereas the Global Stocktake process resulted in progressive outcomes, the pursuit for consistent and transparent implementation of the Global Stocktake outcome is likely to impair the gains envisaged in the recommendations.
- ▶ In a continent with acute need for climate finance to address climate actions across all the spheres and sectors, the emerging phenomenon of reverse flow of climate finance to the developed countries must be urgently addressed
- ▶ Increasingly climate response actions, including transitional measures have not been devoid of rights violations and hence the need for strengthened accountability actions.

G.2: Key Asks on Transparency :

1. Developed countries should provide sufficient and predictable resources to support the building of sustainable institutional capacities and for regular reporting by developing country Parties.
2. Open governance: African governments must as a priority drastically improve on their level of sharing of information and climate finance data to improve accountability for developed north parties
3. Enhance access of funds from multilateral institutions to civil societies and other non-state actors to strengthen accountability and transparency processes within state and non-state entities implementing climate change programmes for accountable climate action.
4. Call on UNFCCC to urgently introduce and monitor enforcement of policies, laws and programmes by developed and highly emitting countries to reduce emissions in line with the 1.5C temperature goal;

SPECIAL NEEDS & CIRCUMSTANCES FOR AFRICA

1. Call on COP 29 to launch work on the consideration of the special needs and special circumstances of Africa under the Paris Agreement in line with the relevant and previous decisions adopted by the COPs
2. African countries including African Least Developing Countries (LDCs), and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) align with Africa's unified position, particularly regarding the continent's special needs and circumstances under the Paris Agreement in relation to support

-END-



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Azerbaijan



**PANAFRICAN CLIMATE JUSTICE ALLIANCE
(PACJA)**

Continental Secretariat, Kabarnet Road,
Off Ngong Road J13
P. O. Box 51005 00200,
Nairobi, Kenya



COP29.PACJA.ORG